



**TRAFFIC CONTROL FOR A
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE OUTBREAK
IN LIVESTOCK OR POULTRY IN
FRANKLIN COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS**

An Agricultural Emergency Response Planning Tool

Developed by

FRANKLIN REGIONAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS

FRANKLIN COUNTY SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

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This plan was written by the Franklin County Solid Waste Management District and the Franklin Regional Council of Governments to assist local law enforcement officials with conducting traffic control in the event of a contagious disease outbreak in the livestock or poultry population. A companion document addresses decontamination and disinfection procedures during a contagious animal disease outbreak. There is also a Franklin County Comprehensive Response Plan for Animal Carcass Management Related to a Disaster.

This plan is based almost exclusively on the Nebraska Department of Agriculture's *Agricultural Response Monograph Number 001*. A copy of Nebraska's Agricultural Response Plans is available at www.agr.ne.gov/homeland/homeland.htm. We appreciate the willingness of Nebraska state officials to allow us to use their plan as a template for Franklin County, Massachusetts.

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For more information about agricultural emergency response planning contact the Franklin Regional Council of Governments at 413-774-3167 or visit www.frcog.org. Information is also available through the Franklin County Solid Waste Management District at 413-772-2438 or at www.franklincountywastedistrict.org.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 SCOPE AND APPLICATION	1
2.0 SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES.....	1
2.1 Locating Traffic-Control Points.....	4
2.2 Stopping Traffic.....	6
2.2.1 Personnel - No Access Points	6
2.2.2 Equipment - No Access Points	7
2.2.3 Methodology - No Access Points	8
2.3 Access Corridors.....	9
2.3.1 Personnel - Access Corridors.....	9
2.3.1.1 Traffic Control and Restricting Access - Access Corridors.....	10
2.3.1.2 Decontamination and Disinfection Personnel.....	10
2.3.2 Equipment - Access Corridor.....	11
2.3.3 Access Screening	12
2.3.4 Methodology - Access Corridor.....	13
2.4 Health and Safety.....	14
2.5 Communication.....	15
2.6 Documentation.....	16
2.6.1 Resources Used.....	18
2.7 Training.....	18
2.8 Public Information	19
APPENDIX A Biosecurity	22

1.0 SCOPE AND APPLICATION

The purpose of this plan is to provide functional guidance about the establishment, operation and maintenance of traffic-control points associated with a contagious animal disease (CAD) outbreak and a resulting livestock or poultry quarantine. It is assumed that local law enforcement officials are well trained in traffic control procedures. It is also assumed that local law enforcement officials will be the first law enforcement personnel to respond in the initial phase of testing for a CAD and maintaining traffic control away from areas harboring a potential contagious animal disease outbreak. This plan provides information specific to a CAD. It is assumed that local law enforcement officials will determine if and when to use an incident command system in their response.

2.0 SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES

This plan presents the operational considerations and details associated with controlling traffic in the event of a suspected or actual CAD outbreak which results in the need to establish an animal or livestock quarantine. Owners of livestock and poultry will be educated to identify the signs and symptoms of contagious animal diseases. If they notice any of these signs and symptoms they are instructed to contact their local veterinarian and the Massachusetts State Veterinarian. If there is a valid possibility of a CAD then testing will be initiated. This is the first point in the CAD response process at which local law enforcement officials will need to be involved, by diverting traffic away from the farm and area of the suspected CAD outbreak.

Should the test results be positive for a CAD, then the Massachusetts Department of Agriculture and the Massachusetts State Veterinarian will issue a quarantine order. This order isolates specific livestock, premises, counties, districts, or sections of the state and restricts the movement of livestock in order to prevent the spread of a disease. In the event that an animal quarantine is necessary, the area cordoned off would be incident or disease dependent, and may

be divided into zones. This scenario might involve an expansion of the initial traffic control plan implemented during the testing phase.

To prevent the spread of a contagious animal disease, movement into and out of a quarantine area must be minimized. Control of the movement of people as well as that of animals, animal products, vehicles, equipment, and other materials is critical to the maintenance of biosecurity. Only movement which is absolutely necessary, such as transportation of a medical emergency patient, and which poses minimal risk to animal health should occur under certain conditions.

Restricted movement of people may be voluntary until authorized by specific language in a Governor's Declaration of Emergency. Prior to an emergency declaration, officials may be able to garner compliance in the general population by encouraging behavior in the best interest of their communities, which would include a sanitizing process before exiting a contaminated area. Defeating the purpose of a quarantine may result in personal liability to others harmed by such action.

Under a quarantine situation, two types of traffic control must be provided: stopping traffic (no access) and controlled access (access corridors). While both forms of traffic control share common components, they are addressed separately under this plan. Decontamination and disinfection are critical components of establishing access corridors and they are addressed in a separate plan for emergency responders entitled "*Decontamination and Disinfection for a Contagious Disease Outbreak in Livestock or Poultry.*" Initially in a CAD response it may be necessary to stop all movement out of an infected area until proper biosecurity measures can be implemented.

The National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) has established specific terminology associated with a CAD outbreak and the potential for disease spread (NAHEMS 2003). This terminology is critical for instituting traffic control measures associated with a CAD outbreak. Premises that have animals that are confirmed as being infected or

exposed to a CAD are considered **Infected Premises (IP)**. Premises that are linked to a known IP through epidemiological evidence (direct or indirect contact with infected animals, or contaminated equipment or personnel) but have not been diagnosed as having the disease are known as **Contact Premises (CP)**. The area around the IPs and CPs is referred to as the **Infected Zone (IZ)**. In some cases the distribution of the Contact Premises and logistical concerns may make it impractical to include all of them in the IZ. The Infected Zone may have a minimum initial radius of 6.2 miles from the outermost Infected Premise or presumptive positive operation. The radius is dependant on the disease and will be determined by the State Veterinarian.

A presumptive positive determination is based on clinical signs, epidemiology and in some cases field sample analysis. An additional zone will be established around the IZ. This zone is called the **Buffer Surveillance Zone (BSZ)** and will include any Contact Premises not in the Infected Zone. This zone may be defined by a border parallel to the IZ boundary and may have a minimum radius of 6.2 miles from the IZ. In some cases, the initial BSZ may encompass the entire state where the CAD was confirmed. The area encompassing the Infected Zone and the Buffer Surveillance Zone is called the **Control Zone (CZ)**. The CZ will constitute the general quarantine area associated with a CAD outbreak.

Personnel working in the Infected Zone that come into direct contact with infected animals, equipment or other organic material (manure, soil etc.) will undergo decontamination and disinfection procedures discussed in this Plan and in a separate plan for emergency responders entitled “*Decontamination and Disinfection for a Contagious Disease Outbreak in Livestock or Poultry.*” Even after personal decontamination and disinfection, these personnel should not come into contact with susceptible animals for several weeks. A listing of susceptible animals and incubation periods for some foreign animal diseases is shown in Table 1.

This plan contains information from and is consistent with current NAHEMS guidelines, as of June 2006.

2.1 Locating Traffic-Control Points

Traffic control associated with a potential CAD outbreak (while awaiting test results) should be established by local law enforcement officials around the perimeter of the suspected Infected Premise (IP). Traffic, including deliveries to and from the potential IP, should be limited. This precaution is necessary should the test results be positive and a confirmed CAD is identified at the suspected IP. Local law enforcement officials may need to request assistance through mutual aid agreements.

Once a CAD has been confirmed and a quarantine order is in place, traffic control should be established around the perimeter of the Infected Zone (IZ) (NAHEMS 2005). In this scenario, local law enforcement officials may have a subordinate role to state and federal officials. In a CAD outbreak, the specific location of traffic-control points will be determined by the Unified Command (UC), which will include state and/or federal veterinarians, staff from the Massachusetts Department of Agriculture, and the USDA.

In all situations, traffic control should have the following goals:

- Preventing the movement of susceptible or infected animals out of the Infected Zone (without specific movement controls).
- Preventing animal products from susceptible or infected animals from leaving the Infected Zone (without specific movement controls).
- Controlling movement of vehicles, equipment, personnel and non-susceptible animals out of the Infected Zone, to allow only essential transport and ensure appropriate biosecurity procedures are followed.
- Conducting a public awareness campaign to increase compliance with movement restrictions.

Specific state or federal approved plans may allow the movement of live animals or animal products out of an infected zone based on approved biosecurity and safety protocol.

TABLE 1

Highly Contagious Animal Diseases, Susceptible Animals and Incubation Periods¹

Disease	Incubation Period (days)	Cattle	Sheep	Goats	Swine	Poultry	Wildlife
Foot-and-Mouth Disease	2 – 14	X	X	X	X		Ruminants, rats and mice
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza	3 – 5				X	X	It is reasonable to assume that all avian species are susceptible to infection
Newcastle Disease	4 – 6					X	Most avian species, especially waterfowl and parrots
Rinderpest	3 – 15	X	X	X	X		Most wild cloven-hoofed animals
Peste des Petits Ruminants	3 – 10		X	X			White-tailed deer
African Swine Fever	5 – 15				X		Feral pigs
Classical Swine Fever	2 – 14				X		Feral pigs
Swine Vesicular Disease	2 – 7				X		

Note: ¹ The listed incubation periods were obtained from the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) disease cards. The remainder of the table was taken from NAHEMS 2003.

The actual Infected Zone boundaries will be based on geographical, epidemiological, social, and economic criteria. The UC is responsible for locating access corridors and no-access points associated with the requested traffic control zone. The UC should include, or at least coordinate with, local highway departments and MassHighway personnel when locating access-control points. Expansion or contraction of traffic control boundaries will be determined by the UC. It will be the lead veterinarian’s responsibility to communicate the need for boundary shifts to the UC. Operations staff will communicate the changes to personnel staffing the traffic-control points and direct their resulting actions.

If possible, the location of access corridors should be based on prevailing winds in the Infected Zone. Access corridors should be situated upwind from the IZ.

2.2 Stopping Traffic

The following information identifies personnel, equipment, and other supporting services that should be provided to establish, operate, and maintain no-access traffic-control points. Two types of no-access traffic-control points are possible: staffed and unstaffed. Clearly, staffed traffic-control points are preferable to unstaffed. However, if personnel and resources are limited, local law enforcement officials should consider unstaffed traffic-control points on outlying secondary roads and secondary roads that are at the outer perimeter of the Infected Zone.

2.2.1 Personnel - No Access Points

Staffed no-access traffic-control points will generally be situated on heavily traveled routes. These points should be operated by at least two people. The use of two people provides backup in the event of injury and allows traffic control and detour assistance to occur simultaneously. Generally, it is best to have at least one law enforcement officer associated with a staffed no-access traffic-control point. Local law enforcement officials might need assistance through mutual aid from other towns. If this is not possible, available law enforcement officers should be assigned groups of traffic-control points that they can monitor and respond to quickly if requests for assistance are made.

Possible law enforcement officials who could provide additional support at no-access traffic-control points include: Franklin County Sheriff, Massachusetts State Police, Massachusetts Environmental Police officers, and military police from the Massachusetts National Guard. Non-law enforcement federal, state, regional, or municipal personnel should be used in a supporting role to staff no-access traffic-control points. Possible municipal

departments that could be used for support include the fire and public works departments. Officials might also access citizen corps or other volunteer organizations as appropriate. If these groups are used, the municipal attorney should evaluate volunteers' liability relative to assisting the town in the response to a livestock or poultry emergency. Every effort should be made to limit or remove associated liabilities for volunteers.

In many cases, traffic control will be an extended operation. Individuals staffing no-access traffic control points will need to be provided food, water, and sanitary facilities.

2.2.2 Equipment - No Access Points

It is assumed that local law enforcement officials are trained in traffic control and understand the equipment needed to maintain traffic control points. However, in most CAD situations there will not be time to consider what equipment is and isn't needed; therefore the following list of equipment is identified for ease of implementation. Each no-access traffic-control point should have the following:

- Barricades (plastic, concrete, metal, hay bales, etc.): Any material can be used to create barriers to stop the flow of traffic. If there is a need to establish unmanned no-access points due to limited personnel resources, barricades must be of sufficient size and design to prevent the movement of traffic along the chosen road. While the possibility exists that travelers may try to bypass an unmanned no-access point, the use of signage and temporary fencing may help prevent this practice.
- Signage: Signage should be constructed of waterproof materials. Signs will be necessary to:
 - Identify the traffic-control point.
 - Identify alternate detours.
 - Explain why the traffic-control point has been established.

- **Communication:** Each access-control point should be provided a means of communication through the chain of command with the incident command (IC). Generally, this will consist of portable radios tied into the IC's frequency.
- **Reflective vests**
- **Shelter:** Shelter for the personnel staffing the no-access points, depending on the season, should provide protection against temperature extremes, winds, and precipitation.
- **Lighting:** Lighting should be established to mark the no-access point and provide general area illumination for staff working at the no-access point. Flashers attached to barriers or signs can be used to alert approaching travelers of the impending traffic-control point. With any lighting system, it will be necessary to provide electricity, either with batteries, generators, or drop service from power lines. The use of a drop service will require coordination with the local power company.
- **Portable sanitary facilities:** Since it is likely these services will be needed over an extended time, portable sanitary facilities should be considered. A cleaning and pumping schedule will need to be established.
- **Maps:** It may be necessary to provide travelers, rerouted at a no-access point, a physical map to help them navigate a detour. These maps can be as simple as a general county map with the detour highlighted.

Equipment can be purchased through the Massachusetts Statewide Contract for Emergencies. This contract includes emergency response supplies, services, and equipment. Municipal departments do not need to go out to bid to use this contract. The contract can be found on line through the Massachusetts Operational Services Division.

2.2.3 Methodology - No Access Points

The specific methodology that applies to personnel and equipment to prevent road access into a quarantine area will be dependent on the specific resources available and the number of no-access points involved. It may include a combination of staffed and unstaffed no-access points. The method(s) used must reasonably ensure that vehicular traffic across the access-control point does not occur, either into or out of the suspected Infected Premise and the Infected Zone. It is assumed that local law enforcement officials have pre-existing standard operating procedures or

guidance for stopping and rerouting traffic. These procedures should be directly applicable for traffic control during a suspected or actual CAD outbreak.

2.3 Access Corridors

An access corridor is a location where essential personnel and equipment are allowed, under certain conditions, to enter and exit a quarantine area. Access corridors will utilize many of the same resources associated with a no-access point. Access corridors will have additional requirements associated with providing decontamination and disinfection (personnel, pets, vehicles, and other possessions) and documenting and regulating access. Specific considerations of decontamination and disinfection are in a separate plan for emergency responders entitled “*Decontamination and Disinfection for a Contagious Disease Outbreak in Livestock or Poultry.*” The following information identifies the personnel, equipment, and other supporting services that should be provided to establish, operate, and maintain access corridors for the controlled movement of people, animals, and vehicles into and out of a quarantine zone.

2.3.1 Personnel - Access Corridors

Access corridors will require two groups of staff. One group will control traffic and restrict access. The second group will provide inspection and disinfection services to people, vehicles, pets, and other possessions leaving the quarantine zone. Both groups should consist of at least two people. Operations will assign personnel to the various tasks associated with an access corridor. Generally, these workers will need to be provided food, water, and sanitary facilities.

Personnel assigned to access corridors and who can potentially come in contact with infected materials or equipment should be advised to stay away from susceptible animals several weeks after they leave the access corridor. This is referred to as no-contact time. The state-level Incident Command will likely provide additional guidance on no-contact times. In some cases the no-contact time will be based on the potential for exposure associated with each job at an access corridor.

2.3.1.1 Traffic Control and Restricting Access - Access Corridors

At least one law enforcement officer should be staffing this portion of an access corridor. Local law enforcement officials might need assistance through mutual aid from other towns. If this is not possible, available law enforcement officers should be assigned groups of traffic-control points that they can monitor and respond to quickly if requests for assistance are made.

Possible law enforcement officials who could provide additional support at access corridor traffic-control points include: Franklin County Sheriff, Massachusetts State Police, Massachusetts Environmental Police officers, and military police from the Massachusetts National Guard. Non-law enforcement federal, state, regional, or municipal personnel should be used in a supporting role to staff access corridor traffic-control points. Possible municipal departments that could be used for support include the fire and public works departments. Officials might also access citizen corps or other volunteer organizations as appropriate. If these groups are used, the municipal attorney should evaluate volunteers' liability relative to assisting the town in the response to a livestock or poultry emergency. Every effort should be made to limit or remove associated liabilities for volunteers.

2.3.1.2 Decontamination and Disinfection Personnel

It is not necessary to use law enforcement personnel at a Decontamination and Disinfection station at an access corridor. Generally, staff working here will require training in the following areas: operation and maintenance of a disinfection or cleaning station, biosecurity, and foreign animal disease (FAD). Training in the latter two areas can be provided by local veterinary staff. The training will allow these personnel to make informed decisions regarding the need for, and adequacy of, disinfection; as well as the background to identify possible disease spread vectors inside vehicles otherwise associated with travelers. This information can be found in a separate plan for emergency responders entitled "*Decontamination and Disinfection for a Contagious Disease Outbreak in Livestock or Poultry.*"

Often, local fire and rescue personnel have had training in decontamination and disinfection. In some cases, these groups will have pre-established procedures for the setup and operation of personal and vehicle cleaning stations relative to a hazardous waste incident. These procedures will be directly applicable to the decontamination and disinfection needed at an access-control point set up for a CAD response.

However, law enforcement officials should emphasize to their personnel the need to practice measures at traffic control points that will prevent the spread of disease. This means having no contact with any person, vehicle, or equipment in the quarantined area.

2.3.2 Equipment - Access Corridor

The equipment needed to create and support an access-control point is the same as that needed to stop traffic. See page 7-8 for details on barricades, signage, communication, shelter, lighting, portable sanitary facilities, and maps. The exception is associated with the decontamination and disinfection activities conducted at access-control points. The process of decontamination and disinfection is addressed in a separate plan for emergency responders entitled “*Decontamination and Disinfection for a Contagious Disease Outbreak in Livestock or Poultry.*”

The following list identifies additional equipment that could be used at an access corridor.

- Traffic control personnel should be given specific information, with illustrative photographs if possible, on susceptible animals that should not be allowed to leave the Infected Zone. (Susceptible animals should not be allowed movement unless appropriate documentation can be provided.) In the event of any question about personnel’s ability to identify the designated species of animals correctly, photographs or other information about unique characteristics should be provided.
- Traffic control personnel should be given specific information, with illustrative photographs if possible, on non-susceptible animals and the conditions under which they can be allowed to leave the Infected Zone. Movement of non-susceptible animals may require a permit and could be contingent upon specific, rigorous Decontamination and Disinfection requirements. Animals coming from an IZ should be assumed to have been

in close contact with infected or contact animals or premises, unless otherwise directed by the Incident Command. This may also extend to personal pets within the IZ.

Traffic control personnel should be given a list of companion animals that may be allowed movement in the company of their owners. The owners may be responsible for seeing that their pets are clean so that the animals do not act as carriers of disease pathogens. In some instances the Incident Command may determine that pets will need Decontamination and Disinfection prior to leaving an Infected Zone.

Proposed movements of all other animals should be checked with Incident Command personnel.

2.3.3 Access Screening

Quarantine zone ingress and egress control is a crucial part of disease containment and response management. This control directly affects disease containment, and it provides security for residents living within the quarantine areas. Only responders and residents should be allowed to enter the quarantine zone. In either case, *personnel staffing the access corridor should be provided lists of responders and residents cleared for access.* A state or federally issued form of identification should be required to verify the identification of anyone desiring entry into the quarantine zone. After the initial identity verification, the issuance of a temporary access card, or other traceable indicator of approved access, could be issued to responders and residents to speed up flow through the access corridor. Depending on the security level required, examples of these indicators can range from simple color-coded dashboard cards to computer scanned bar-coded access cards.

As responders and residents exit or enter a quarantine zone, their identities must be verified, and their names, time of entry, and exit should be documented. If there are unusual circumstances associated with an entry or access, this should be documented as well.

Documentation will be essential to tracking vehicles, animals, and people who exit and enter the quarantine area.

2.3.4 Methodology - Access Corridor

The specific methodology used to control access into and out of a quarantine area will be dependent on the specific resources available to the UC, as well as the number of access points involved. As with traffic-control no-access points, the method(s) must reasonably ensure that vehicular traffic across the access-control point is controlled, and Decontamination and Disinfection protocols are maintained, either into or out of the quarantine area.

If a person in the Infected Zone is injured or becomes seriously ill, every effort must be made to obtain medical care for the person as quickly as possible. The very nature of a CAD response means that there is a risk of transporting the infection with the injured person. To minimize this potential, the following steps should be taken as soon as arrangements for an ambulance or other vehicle have been made (NAHEMS 2003):

- The Incident Commander should be notified of the incident.
- An individual experienced in biosecurity and Decontamination and Disinfection procedures should be sent—along with Decontamination and Disinfection supplies—to meet the emergency vehicle at the medical facility.
- The Incident Commander or their designee should inform authorities at the medical facility of the existence of the risk of CAD transmission and ensure that Decontamination and Disinfection procedures for the patient and medical personnel are initiated as soon as appropriate.
- The patient’s clothing and any of the medical personnel’s clothing that may have become contaminated should be sealed in a plastic garbage bag. The clothing then should either be (a) discarded safely or (b) removed from the bag and laundered, with care taken to dispose of the contaminated bag safely. Any contaminated medical equipment should be cleaned thoroughly (if possible, autoclaved) and disinfected with an approved disinfectant.
- Any surface—inside or outside the medical facility—that may have become contaminated should be cleaned thoroughly and disinfected with an approved disinfectant.
- The emergency vehicle should be cleaned and disinfected, including the interior, underside, wheels, and wheel wells, and then taken through an automated carwash facility. (See “Biosecurity,” Appendix A.)
- Any clothing or boots of emergency vehicle attendants, orderlies, or other personnel that may have become contaminated should be removed, sealed in a plastic garbage bag, and laundered, dry cleaned, or disinfected with an approved disinfectant or discarded.

The continuation of public services that are deemed essential will be critical to supporting residents in an Infected Zone. The Incident Command will determine what types of restrictions are necessary for community institutions and businesses that must operate within the IZ. Examples of possible activities include: (a) delivery of groceries, fuel, mail, and other items and (b) necessary trips for medical and dental care, counseling, banking, or other important reasons. Restrictions may range from entry into the Buffered Surveillance Zone or Infected Zone under permit only to informal agreements between the businesses or institutions and the Incident Command. These restrictions or arrangements must be conveyed to access corridor personnel.

An example of human movement restriction associated with an IZ could involve school children not residing at an Infected Premise. Incident Command may determine that these children can be moved between their residence and a school located outside the IZ with minimal risk to animal health if the following policies are followed (NAHEMS 2003):

- Each child should take a bath or shower before leaving for school.
- Each child should wear freshly laundered clothing.
- Each child should wear clean shoes and/or boots.
- Children should not visit any animal facilities.

In evaluating proposed movements of children (and adults) residing on IPs, further evaluation and more stringent restrictions would likely be in order.

2.4 Health and Safety

General first aid and access to emergency medical services must be provided at all traffic-control locations that are staffed. Law enforcement personnel staffing no-access points will require personal protective equipment only if they are involved in decontamination and disinfection. Decontamination and disinfection workers should wear waterproof clothing or rain suits, with hoods that can be disinfected and reused. Rubber gloves and rubber boots also will be needed.

These items can be disinfected and reused. Under gloves, cotton or nitrile, should be worn under the outer rubber glove. The personnel also should wear hardhats fitted with face shields to protect their faces. Unless stipulated by the Safety Officer, respiratory protection may not be necessary. In addition, dust masks can also be worn to protect the workers' mouths and to prevent ingesting splashed materials.

Equipment can be purchased through the Massachusetts Statewide Contract for Emergencies. This contract includes emergency response supplies, services, and equipment. Municipal departments do not need to go out to bid to use this contract. The contract can be found on line through the Massachusetts Operational Services Division.

2.5 Communication

Due to the dynamic nature of an emergency response to a CAD, the establishment, maintenance and relocation of traffic-control points must be coordinated with the ever-changing understanding of the nature and extent of the disease. In order to allow the traffic-control points to quickly respond to changing field conditions, communication between the traffic-control point personnel and the EOC must be maintained through the chain of command. Real-time communication and preshift meetings constitute the required communication needed to support traffic-control points.

It will be helpful to provide citizens impacted by traffic control with information sheets that address the causes, response, and future relative to the incident. An information sheet should address the following topics (NAHEMS 2003):

- Provide information on the reason for the traffic control measures used, reinforcing the concepts conveyed verbally by traffic control personnel.
- Provide information on how to obtain a permit for animal movement.
- Provide information, including maps, on alternative routes to major destinations.
- Provide information on basic biosecurity measures, including decontamination and disinfection, as well as a list of readily available approved disinfectants for use by the public along with information on the safe use and disposal of these disinfectants. This

information should be coordinated through the Massachusetts State Veterinarian's office and the Incident Command.

- Anticipate and deflect at least some of the drivers' questions and provide the driver with the opportunity to learn more about the animal health emergency and the response to it while waiting.
- Allow for uniform information dissemination and foster increased public support for and cooperation with animal health emergency response efforts. The information sheet should list the appropriate Incident Command Post and MA Department of Agriculture telephone numbers that can be used by members of the public wishing further information. Traffic control personnel should refer individuals with questions to the information sources and telephone numbers provided.

2.6 Documentation

Documentation is critical to providing an accurate record of creating, operating, and maintaining traffic-control points. This information is important in managing an emergency response, managing disease containment, providing liability protection, and in cost recovery efforts.

Due to the nature of an emergency response, it is critical to identify personnel who will be responsible for documenting these issues or monitoring and verifying that the needed documentation is being collected by other parties. In some cases, identifying a specific response job that includes documentation will be preferable, especially if personnel will be rotated through shifts and response jobs.

Documentation should be maintained in written form. Video, photographs, and tape-recorded messages can be used to supplement the written documentation. Written documentation can be maintained in a logbook format, using documentation worksheets, or a combination of both.

Documentation should be recorded with an ink pen, and any entry errors should have a single line drawn through them with the author's initials and date recorded at one end of the line. If a logbook is used, it should have numbered pages and the spine should be sewn, making the removal of pages both difficult and obvious. Pages should never be removed from a logbook. Anyone making entries in the logbook should sign and date the bottom of each page. If

documentation worksheets are used, the author should sign and date the bottom of each worksheet. Logbooks and worksheets should be assigned unique identification numbers. When the logbooks or a group of worksheets is issued to a responder, the identification numbers of the logbooks and worksheets should be recorded and the recipient should sign them out in a document tracking log. This establishes a chain-of-custody for the documentation.

If pictures, video, or taped messages or interviews are used to supplement the written documentation record, the following information should be documented for each picture, video segment, or audio taped message or interview: photographer or interviewer, subject, time, date, person interviewed (video or audio taped), photo and film roll number, direction (pictures and video) and general weather conditions (e.g., temperature, wind direction, humidity, sky condition, etc.).

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2.6.1 Resources Used

Throughout the process of providing traffic-control associated with a CAD, it will be necessary to provide various types of documentation. For indemnity payments to the responding agency or other forms of state or federal reimbursement or cost sharing, it will be necessary to document the resources applied and expended in providing traffic control. These costs can include labor charges, equipment rentals or purchase, costs of expendable equipment or supplies, subcontractor costs, or any other costs associated with providing the traffic-control services. Possible items that should be included in a documentation checklist include:

Responder time (hours)	Meals provided
Number of responders	Location of each responder
Identity of responders	Equipment at each point
Responder's commuting mileage to the traffic-control point	Usage time for equipment
Sanitation services provided	Specific quantities of expendables used

2.7 Training

Personnel training will be a critical component of planning to initiate traffic-control measures in the event of a suspected or actual CAD situation. Tension and conflict can be created between a civilian and a responder when a resident is stopped at a traffic control point and either sent on an alternate route or asked to undergo some type of vehicular or personal decontamination and disinfection. This conflict can occur regardless of the importance of the measures needed to protect the local and regional economies. Public concern and potential conflict associated with traffic control will require training to comfort and defuse potentially volatile citizens. Law enforcement personnel have this training and can be a training resource for non-law enforcement personnel who would support the traffic-control portion of a no-access or access corridor traffic-control point.

Personnel staffing the decontamination and disinfection stations will require training in: Foreign Animal Diseases, biosecurity, the operation and maintenance of the decontamination and disinfection equipment, disinfection procedures, associated environmental protection issues, personal protective equipment, and the inspection of people, vehicles, pets, and other possessions at quarantine zone access points. The quarantine access-control training will require basic training in biosecurity and Foreign Animal Diseases.

Personnel associated with the movement of vehicles through an access corridor will need to be familiar with the documentation requirements and the access screening protocols. Access screening will allow only authorized people to enter a quarantine zone.

2.8 Public Information

During the initial response by local law enforcement officials for a suspected CAD, it will be important to limit the amount of information disseminated so as not to create unnecessary fear among residents and neighbors. Restricting information at this phase also protects the farmer from unnecessary negative publicity which could affect the farm's future financial situation if a CAD is not identified.

Once the quarantine is issued, federal and state officials will initiate a public information and media plan to inform the local community of the existence and location of traffic-control points, and the associated alternate routes. This notification may involve public announcements via radio, television, web site, newspaper, signage announcing the traffic-control points, or any other appropriate mechanisms to inform the public of the areas involved with the traffic control. Local responders should identify and make use of approved state or federal prepared information or press releases that could be used in responding to a CAD. Public notification can help citizens plan alternate routes around quarantine areas or help them understand possible travel delays associated with the traffic-control activities.

In general, response workers should be trained to refer any press or other project-specific inquiries to the federal or state Public Information Officer.

REFERENCES

Nebraska Department of Agriculture *Agricultural Response Monograph Number 001. Traffic Control*. June 2007. www.agr.ne.gov/homeland/homeland.htm

NAHEMS Guidelines. (2003). *Quarantine and Movement Control: Highly Contagious Disease*. United States Department of Agriculture. May 5, 2003.

NAHEMS Guidelines. (2005). *Highly Contagious Diseases*. United States Department of Agriculture. September 2005.

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), Technical Disease Cards, Website:
http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/en_fiches.htm , November 2006

APPENDIX A

BIOSECURITY

(adapted from NAHEMS 2003)

Before ENTERING a premise (infected or suspected of being infected),

DO:

- Park your vehicle away from site production facilities and ensure that your vehicle's tires and wheel wells have been hosed so they are free of dirt and debris and that your vehicle has been taken through a pressure car wash.
- Designate a "clean" area in your vehicle—usually the passenger compartment. Keep it separate from the "dirty" area—usually the trunk or cargo area.
- Put on clean coveralls, boots, hat, gloves, and other apparel and use only clean equipment and supplies.
- Wash your hands with soap and water.
- Consult with the owner to identify an arbitrary line on the site demarcating a "clean" side and a "dirty" side.

DON'T:

- Enter a site's or vehicle's "clean" area unless you have disposed of or cleaned and disinfected all clothes, footwear, hats, gloves, equipment, supplies, and other sources of disease transmission.
- Attempt to disinfect a surface unless it first has been thoroughly cleaned.
- Drive your vehicle on premises any more than necessary. An on-site vehicle should be used for on-site transportation whenever possible.

Before LEAVING a premise (infected or suspected of being infected),

DO:

- Use a brush and approved disinfectant to clean and disinfect all reusable equipment and clothing, including eyewear and boots, thoroughly.
- Hose down vehicle tires and wheel wells so they are free of dirt and debris.
- Place disposable coveralls (turned “inside out”), boots, and other soiled items in a plastic garbage bag to be left with the owner or placed in the “dirty” area of your vehicle.
- Dispose of the disinfectant solution according to label instructions.
- Dispose of all plastic garbage bags containing soiled supplies in a manner that prevents exposure to other people or animals.
- Wash your hands with soap and water.
- Clean and launder all reusable clothing and equipment.
- Take a shower and shampoo your hair, clean under your fingernails, and clear your respiratory passages by blowing your nose, clearing your throat, expectorating into a sink with running water, and washing your hands with soap and water.

DON'T:

- Bring “dirty” paperwork into the clean area of your vehicle.
- Visit another susceptible site until 12 hours have passed, or as directed by the Incident Commander or the State Veterinarian. The minimum waiting period of 12 hours applies only to official animal health emergency personnel who follow biosecurity procedures on their premises visits. For other premises visitors, the minimum waiting period is 5 days.

Additional information is available in the NAHEMS 2003.